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‘‘He is a child and this land is a borderland of Islam’’:
Under-age Rule and the Quest for Political Stability
in the Ayy ubid Period1
KONRAD HIRSCHLER
ABSTRACT During the late and post-6Abbasid periods, dynasties in Islamic lands
witnessed numerous under-age rulers. Given the personalised nature of pre-modern rule,
the succession of a child to the throne posed a potential threat both to the polity’s stability
and to the dynasty’s survival. The Ayy ubid family confederation in Egypt and Syria
provides, due to the considerable number of under-age rulers in its various branches,
fine examples that illustrate the complex relationships between under-age rule and political
stability. After discussing the legal concept of maturity and the principal modes of
succession dominant in the period, this article considers the issue of regents, arguing
that under-age rule was generally conducted without frictions as two main strategies were
employed in order to avoid instability. On the one hand, the flexible concept of succession
allowed reaction to the various internal challenges that arose over time. On the other hand,
a sense of solidarity within the confederation could be activated in order to fight back
against external powers that tried to take advantage of these periods of potential weakness.
Keywords: Ayy ubid dynasty; Egypt – politics; Syria – politics; rulership – underage
rulers
Under-age rule was a salient feature of governance in the later and post-6Abbasid
periods. While the accession to power of the thirteen-year-old 6Abbasid Caliph
al-Muqtadir (r. 295–320/908–932) was still a novelty, under-age rule became
a common feature of various regional dynasties in the following centuries.
This regular appearance of under-age rule parallels European medieval history,
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when half of the kings of dynasties such as the Merovingian rose to the throne as
children.2 Rule by such young individuals is, irrespective of its regional setting, an
intriguing aspect of pre-modern kingship since governance was strongly centred on
the person of the king himself. The polities in the Islamic world, although
administratively complex by the standards of Latin Christendom, were ruled by
political systems that had – compared to the modern state – weakly developed
bureaucratic structures, few specialised institutions and rarely clear territorial
delimitations. The relatively low importance of elaborate tools of governance was,
in the period considered here, to a large degree compensated for by individual
relationships and informal networks. The central role of these non-formalised
bonds, as well as the absence of non-personal identity markers common to the
modern state (such as shape of borders or a flag) set the ruler at centre stage: it was
he who founded the dynasty – the dawla – led the troops, dispensed justice and was
the focal point of the elites’ political loyalty. On the symbolic level, and even to
some degree on the level of concrete rule, the polity could hardly be dissociated
from the person of the ruler.
Evidently, under-age rule put considerable strain on such personalised polities,
whose dynasties’ survival, as well as the survival of the polity itself, were dependent
on securing solutions. The political actors were confronted with two sets of
challenges. On the one hand, expansionist tendencies of neighbouring powers were
nurtured by potential instability. On the other hand, claims to the throne by
regents, other members of the political elite and relatives could lead to internal
strife. The present article focuses on this second set, the ‘internal’ issues, in
particular the underlying question as to what degree under-age rule and instability
were linked. This focus on internal measures, which were meant to deal with the
period of ‘crisis’, offers not only valuable insights into the issue of under-age rule
but also into ruling practices in general.
The concrete example considered here is the Ayy ubid dynasty, the ruling house
founded by S
_
alah
_
al-Din (r. 564–589/1169–1193), which governed Egypt, Syria,
parts of northern Mesopotamia and Yemen in the late sixth/twelfth and first half of
the seventh/thirteenth century. This dynasty is a case in point as at least nine of its
31 rulers – taking into account the seven main Ayy ubid branches in Egypt,
Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Diyar Bakr I (Mayyafariqin and Jabal Sinjar)
and Diyar Bakr II (H
_
is
_
n Kayfa, Amid and Akhlat
_
)3 – might be considered under age
2For under-age rule in the European Middle Ages cf. T. Offergeld, Reges pueri. Das Ko¨nigtum
Minderja¨hriger im fru¨hen Mittelalter (Hannover, 2001); D. Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III (Berkeley,
1990); T. Ko¨lzer, ‘‘Das Ko¨nigtum Minderja¨hriger im fra¨nkisch-deutschen Mittelalter’’, Historische
Zeitschrift, 251 (1990): 291–323; A. Wolf, ‘‘Ko¨nigtum Minderja¨hriger und das Institut der
Regentschaft’’, in L’Enfant, Deuxie`me partie: Europe me´die´vale et moderne [Receuils de la socie´te´ Jean
Bodin 36] (Brussels, 1976), pp. 97–106; W. Ulrich, Regentschaft bei Unmu¨ndigkeit des fra¨nkischen
Herrschers (Bonn, 1964); H. Fricke, ‘‘Reichsvikare, Reichsregenten und Reichsstatthalter des deutschen
Mittelalters’’, PhD Thesis, University of Go¨ttingen, 1949.
3Cf. C.E. Bosworth, The New Islamic Dynasties. A Chronological and Genealogical Manual (Edinburgh,
2004), pp. 70–3 for the principal names and dates. The branches in Yemen and minor places such as
Karak, Baalbek, and Baniyas have been left out as the source basis was too weak for the present
discussion, especially as even an approximate identification of rulers’ dates of birth proved impossible.
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when they rose to power (cf. Table I, Under-age rulers in the Ayy ubid period).4
Certainly, many of the local dynasties occasionally came either under ‘central’
Egyptian rule or that of their more powerful neighbouring branch. However, their
repeated claims to some degree of independence via the regalia (such as khut
_
ba and
coinage) allow treating them as separate cases.
The Ayy ubids (564–650/1169–1252 in Egypt, 570–658/1175–1260 in Syria,
569–627/1174–1229 in Yemen)5 ruled their lands as a family confederation,
especially after the death of S
_
alah
_
al-Din. The local branches formed petty
dynasties in Egypt as well as in the Syrian and northern Mesopotamian towns and
regions. These dynasties descended from various members of the Ayy ubid family:
the descendents of S
_
alah
_
al-Din for instance governed Aleppo, the descendents of
S
_
alah
_
al-Din’s paternal uncle Asad al-Din Shirk uh (d. 564/1169) ruled Homs,
and the descendents of S
_
alah
_
al-Din’s brother al-Malik al-6Adil (r. 596–615/
1200–1218) came to play the dominant role in most towns and regions east of the
Euphrates and south of Homs. The ruler of Egypt generally claimed overlordship
within this confederation, but continuously had to assert this claim and defend it
from his relatives, who were opposed to his rule owing to local interests. The careers
of al-Malik al-6Adil, his son al-Malik al-Kamil (r. 615–635/1218–1238) and the
latter’s son al-Malik al-S
_
alih
_
(r. 637–647/1240–1249), the main Ayy ubid rulers of
Egypt, were largely consumed with efforts to foster and/or expand their positions
within the family confederation. In spite of their success, their deaths set back any
tendency towards centralised rule, and each successor had to start imposing the
centre’s hegemony anew.6
That under-age rule was a common feature of the Ayy ubid period is apparent on
various levels, for example the entitlement of under-age rulers to the same standard
symbolic procedures as adult rulers. Not only did this extend to the aforementioned
regalia of the khut
_
ba and the coinage, but also to those linked to the decisive period
when power was transferred from the deceased/deposed ruler to his successor. For
example, after al-Malik al-Z
_
ahir of Aleppo (governor 579/1183 and ruler 582–613/
1186–1216) died in 613/1216, the claim of the kingship by his two-year-old son and
heir apparent al-Malik al-6Aziz (r. 613–634/1216–1236), as well as the death of
4Multiple reigns by the same individual – either in several polities or in the same – are counted as one.
In such cases, the first accession to power is taken into account. The periods of Maml uk or Mongol
overlordship (e.g. in Diyar Bakr II after 657/1259 and in Hama after 658/1260) are not taken into
account. It was only impossible in one case, al-Malik al-Muz
_
affar Ghazi of Diyar Bakr I
(617–642/1220–1258), to approximate at what age he ascended the throne.
5It was only in some places in northern Syria (e.g. Hama) and Mesopotamia (e.g. Diyar Bakr II) that
Ayy ubid branches survived into the eighth/fourteenth and the ninth/fifteenth centuries.
6There is as yet no monographic overview of the Ayy ubid dynasty. For the time being overview chapters
such as H. Halm, ‘‘Die Ayy ubiden’’, in Geschichte der arabischen Welt, ed. U. Haarmann (Mu¨nchen,
2001), pp. 200–16 and M. Chamberlain, ‘‘The Crusader era and the Ayy ubid dynasty’’, in The
Cambridge History of Egypt, volume 1: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517, ed. C.F. Petry (Cambridge, 1998),
pp. 211–41, have to be supplemented by studies of the local branches, such as A.-M. Edde´, La
principaute´ Ayyoubide d’Alep (579/1183–658/1260) (Stuttgart, 1999); R.S. Humphreys, From Saladin to
the Mongols. The Ayy ubids of Damascus, 1193–1260 (Albany/NY, 1977), and A.Gh. Saban u, Mamlakat
H
_
ama al-Ayy ubiyya (Damascus: Dar Qutayba, 1984). For further studies and primary sources, see
Halm and Chamberlain.
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the ruler, were announced in a highly symbolic manner. Al-Malik al-6Aziz and his
brother al-Malik al-S
_
alih
_
Ah
_
mad (d. 651/1253) presented themselves on horseback
to the town’s populace and elite, which had assembled in front of the citadel. On the
one hand, the brothers were announcing their father’s death by wearing black
clothes. The populace greeted this announcement with wailing and the officers
dismounted from their horses, uncovered their heads and cut their hair. The claim
to succession, on the other hand, was expressed by the ghashiya, a splendidly
decorated saddle-cover, which had been introduced to the Islamic Near East by the
Salj uqs.7 Sayf al-Din 6Ali Ibn Jandar (d. 622/1225),8 the senior amir who had
played a vital role in settling the succession, walked in front of the infant ruler
carrying this crucial element of the Sultan’s regalia. The amirs and members of the
royal family kissed the young ruler’s hand to express their submission.9 A similar
employment of symbolic and ritual resources was also evident when a young prince
was nominated officially as heir apparent. The Egyptian Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil,
for example, rode with his eleven-year-old son al-Malik al-6Adil II (r. 635–637/
1238–1240) through Cairo in order to announce him as his successor with the son
displaying the royal banners.10
Under-age rulers also received the symbols of recognition from their – theoretical
or real – overlord. When al-Malik al-6Aziz of Aleppo turned ten in the year 620/
1223, some eight years after having ascended the throne and some five years before
attaining majority, al-Malik al-Kamil sent him the khil6a, the robe of honour11 and
the sanajiq, the yellow banners of the Sultan from Egypt. Furthermore, the envoy,
al-Malik al-Ashraf I (d. 635/1237), the strongman of Northern Syria, carried the
ghashiya in the procession of the young ruler through the town.12 Al-Malik
al-6Aziz’s son al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Y usuf (r. 634–658/1236–1260) also received a robe
of honour from al-Malik al-Kamil, in this case immediately after his nomination as
ruler of Aleppo at the age of seven.13
Majority and independent rule
Despite the salience of under-age rule and the inclusion of under-age rulers in the
symbolic and ritual practices of the period, it rarely featured as an independent
subject in the genre of medieval political thought, that is to say, in theoretical
7On Ayy ubid ceremony and the ghashiya in particular, see Edde´, 204–6.
8Al-Dhahabi, Muh
_
ammad b. Ah
_
mad (d. 748/1348), Ta8rikh al-Islam wa wafayat al-mashahir wa l-a6lam,
ed. 6U.6Abd al-Salam Tadmuri, volumes I–LII (Beirut: Dar al-kitab al-6arabi, 1987–2000),
vol. 621–630: 109.
9Ibn Was
_
il, Muh
_
ammad b. Salim (d. 697/1298), Mufarrij al-kur ub f i akhbar bani Ayy ub, eds.
J. al-Shayyal/H
_
. al-Rabi6/S. 6Ash ur, vols I–V (Cairo: Wizarat al-thaqafa wa l-irshad al-qawmi, 1953–
1977) and Paris, Bibliothe`que Nationale, MS arabe 1702 and 1703 for years 646–659, III: 241–2.
10Al-Maqrizi, Ah
_
mad b. 6Ali (d. 845/1442), Kitab al-sul uk li-ma6rifat duwal al-mul uk, eds. M.M.
al-Ziyada et al., volumes I–IV (Cairo: Lajnat al-ta8lif wa l-tarjama wa l-nashr, 1934–1975), Ia: 247.
11For the khil6a in general, see M. Springberg-Hinsen, Die Khil6a: Studien zur Geschichte des geschenkten
Gewandes im islamischen Kulturkreis (Wu¨rzburg, 2000).
12Ibn Was
_
il, IV: 129–30.
13Al-Maqrizi, Ia: 254 and Ibn Was
_
il, V: 121. However, other regalia, such as banners, were withheld
from him as al-Malik al-Kamil was dissatisfied with the choice of regents. On the conflict between
al-Malik al-Kamil and Aleppo cf. Edde´, 109ff.
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treatises and mirrors for princes.14 In such works it was only set out that the
potential leader had to have reached sexual maturity in order to qualify, or the issue
was not touched upon at all.15 Compared with the main concerns discussed in the
theoretical texts, namely the legitimacy of decentralised rule and the practical
advice given in the mirrors for princes, the question of under-age rule was evidently
of little concern.
The field of law is of more help in establishing the normative aspects of under-
age rule, as it clearly defines the concepts of minority and majority. Islamic law
differentiates between the major (baligh) adult, obliged to fulfil his religious duties
and fully responsible under criminal law, and the minor (s
_
aghir) child, who is
subject to legal restrictions and guardianship.16 Within the period of minority,
scholars identified several time spans which affect the status of the child. The child
was considered a ‘discerning minor’ (mumayyiz) once it was able to differentiate
between right and wrong, indicating that it could, for example, enter into beneficial
contracts. This point of tamyiz was set between three and ten years,17 and most
authors such as the Damascene theologian and jurisconsultant Ibn Qayyim
al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) refused to set a fixed age.18 Similarly, the age of majority
(bul ugh) did not depend on reaching a certain age, but largely on physical maturity.
While the other schools of law did not impose a minimum age for majority, the
Shafi6i school, the then dominant Sunni school in Syria and Egypt, fixed it at nine
years. If physical maturity did not manifest itself, the general rule was to declare
majority at the age of fifteen years, although for the Maliki school the age was
raised to eighteen. However, conduct of rule did not only require bul ugh, but also
14On medieval political thought cf. P. Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 2004);
A. Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought. From the Prophet to the Present (Edinburgh, 2001);
A.K.S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam. An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political
Theory: the Jurists (Oxford, 1981); T. Nagel, Staat und Glaubensgemeinschaft im Islam. Geschichte der
politischen Ordnungsvorstellungen der Muslime, volumes I–II (Zu¨rich, 1981); E.I.J. Rosenthal, Political
Thought in Medieval Islam. An Introductory Outline (Cambridge, 1958).
15To take two examples composed in Syria during or shortly after the Ayy ubid rule: Ibn Jama6a,
Muh
_
ammad b. Ibrahim (d. 733/1333), ‘‘Tah
_
rir al-ah
_
kam f i tadbir ahl al-islam’’, ed. and tr. H. Kofler,
Islamica, 4 (1934): 349–414; 7 (1935): 1–64; Schlußheft (1938): 18–129, cf. Ibn Jama6a 4: 356 on
baligh. An anonymous mirror for princes composed in seventh/thirteenth-century Syria in Persian does
not contain this condition in its chapter ‘‘On Impediments to Kingship’’, where characteristics such as
‘‘impurity in faith or belief ’’, ‘‘madness or heedlessness’’, ‘‘negligence, senselessness, lack of judgement,
lack of planning, shamelessness, and levity’’ are enumerated, cf. J. Meisami, The Sea of Precious Virtues
(Bah
_
r al-Fava8id): A Medieval Islamic Mirror for Princes (Salt Lake City, 1991), p. 80.
16Cf. H.A.R. Gibb et al. on baligh and A. Giladi on s
_
aghir in Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition,
WebCD edition (Leiden, 2003).
17A. Giladi, Children of Islam. Concepts of Childhood in Medieval Muslim Society (Houndmills/London,
1992), and H. Motzki, ‘‘Das Kind und seine Sozialisation in der islamischen Familie des Mittelalters’’,
in Zur Sozialgeschichte der Kindheit, eds. J. Martin/A. Nitschke (Freiburg/Mu¨nchen, 1986), pp. 391–441,
esp. pp. 420–2. Further helpful items for the concept of childhood are: H. Motzki, ‘‘Geschlechtsreife
und Legitimation zur Zeugung im fru¨hen Islam’’, in Geschlechtsreife und Legitimation zur Zeugung, ed.
E.W. Mu¨ller (Freiburg/Mu¨nchen, 1985), pp. 479–550; A. Giladi, ‘‘Gender differences in child rearing
and education: Some preliminary observations with reference to medieval Muslim thought’’, al-Qantara,
16 (1995): 291–308; A. Giladi, ‘‘Infants, children and death in medieval Muslim society’’, Social History
of Medicine, 3 (1990): 345–368; A. Giladi, ‘‘Concepts of childhood and attitudes towards children in
medieval Islam. A preliminary study with special reference to reactions to infant and child mortality’’,
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 32 (1989): 121–152; F. Rosenthal, ‘‘Child
psychology in Islam’’, Islamic Culture, 26 (1952): 1–22.
18Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Muh
_
ammad b. Abi Bakr (d. 751/1350), Tuh
_
fat al-mawd ud bi-ah
_
kam
al-mawl ud, ed. Ah
_
mad Sulayman (Cairo: Dar Ibn Rajab, 1999): 347–51.
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‘full contractual capacity’, which was acquired by attaining rushd, i.e. intellectual
maturity. Here the picture was even more vague because in general – as with the
question of tamyiz – no age limit was fixed for the point at which rushd had to be
declared (with the exception of the H
_
anaf i school where latest was at twenty-five
years). For the period and regions under consideration here it can thus merely be
stated, from a legalistic perspective, that majority excluding rushd was attained
between nine years and fifteen years while majority including rushd was attained at
some point after nine years.
The legal category of ‘majority’ (in- or excluding rushd) has to be supplemented
by a further category of historical practice: independent/autonomous rule, referred
to as istiqlal in the period’s chronicles. The following discussion will illustrate that
these concepts were not synonymous and why it is also necessary to consider rulers
who had reached legal majority. The age of independent rule varied considerably,
as can be seen in Table I, and it often took several years after reaching majority
before a ruler could de facto obtain independent rule – a period of ‘prolonged under-
age rule’. The only exception in this regard is al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Y usuf of Aleppo,
who attained independent rule at the same point as having reached legal majority in
the year 640/1242. He ‘‘declared himself as having reached majority’’ at the age of
thirteen after his grandmother, who had acted as regent, had died. The chroniclers
added immediately afterwards a passage entitled ‘‘Report on Sultan al-Malik
al-Nas
_
ir’s [...] independence’’.19
In general, the age of sixteen to eighteen was considered to be sufficient for
independent rule. S
_
alah
_
al-Din nominated for instance al-Malik al-Mujahid Asad
al-Din of Homs (581–637/1186–1240) ruler at the age of twelve years. In addition,
he ‘‘nominated at the side of Asad al-Din in Homs an amir of the Asadiyya known
as Arslan B ugha. He [S
_
alah
_
al-Din] gave him [Arslan B ugha] preference over the
latter’s brothers in arms by designating him to the administration of his [Asad
al-Din’s] interests [tawalli mas
_
alih
_
babi-hi] until [. . .] Asad [al-Din] acted properly
on his own and gained full contractual capacity’’.20 The increasing involvement of
al-Malik al-Mujahid Asad al-Din in inner-Ayy ubid politics from 586/1190
onwards,21 shows that the young ruler acquired independent rule at about the
age of seventeen. In a similar case the only example of contractual regency22 to have
been transmitted during the Ayy ubid period limited the regency to the young ruler’s
sixteenth birthday.23 The age of sixteen to eighteen as the standard age of
independent rule is also evident for a number of Ayy ubid rulers who came to power
at this age without having a regent at their side: al-Malik al-Afd
_
al 6Ali of Damascus
(582–592/1186–1196) at the age of seventeen, al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Qilij Arslan of
Hama (617–626/1221–1229) at the age of seventeen and al-Malik al-6Adil II of
Egypt at the age of eighteen.
19Ibn Was
_
il, V: 313.
20Ab u Shama, 6Abd al-Rah
_
man b. Isma6il (d. 665/1267), Kitab al-rawd
_
atayn f i akhbar al-dawlatayn
al-N uriyya wa l-S
_
alah
_
iyya, ed. Ibrahim al-Zibaq, volumes I–V (Beirut: Mu8assasat al-Risala, 1997), III:
252–3.
21For his participation in S
_
alah
_
al-Din’s campaign, see Ab u Shama, Rawd
_
atayn, IV: 119, 241, and 348.
22By which is meant a regency on the basis of an oral or written contract that spelled out the regent’s
rights and obligations. The observance of the contract’s terms was controlled by the court.
23Ibn Was
_
il, III: 90: Among the conditions set out for the regency of al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur (Egypt) in
595/1198.
Under-age Rule and the Quest for Political Stability 35
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
By
: [
H
irs
ch
le
r, 
Ko
nr
ad
] A
t: 
15
:3
4 
29
 M
ar
ch
 2
00
7 
The foregoing reflections explain the inclusion of rulers in Table I whose ages of
accession to power range from two to seventeen years. The cases of al-Malik
al-6Aziz of Aleppo, al-Malik al-Ashraf of Egypt (r. 648–650/1250–1252) and
al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Y usuf of Aleppo, who succeeded as rulers at the age of two, six
and seven respectively, are – from a legal point of view – beyond any doubt
examples of under-age rule in the Ayy ubid period. In contrast, al-Malik al-Ashraf of
Homs (r. 644–662/1246–1263), who came to power at the age of seventeen, is a
clear example of prolonged under-age rule. He had already attained legal majority,
perhaps even intellectual maturity (rushd), before he was declared ruler.
He is nevertheless included in the table as the sources emphasise his youth
(s
_
abiyy) when speaking of his affairs as managed by the vizier Mukhlis
_
al-Din Ibn
Qirnas
_
(d. 646/1248), a de facto regent.24 For those placed in the ‘grey area’
between the ages of nine and fifteen a clear legal status is generally impossible to
ascribe, as the sources hardly ever comment on this issue.25 However, the
descriptions in the sources do not leave any doubt that a ruler such as al-Malik
al-Mans
_
ur II of Hama (r. 642–683/1244–1284), who ascended the throne at the
age of ten, was treated as an under-age ruler with regents at his side.26
The final point to be stressed with regard to legalistic aspects is the fact that the
under-age ruler’s legal status posed a considerable problem. The affairs of
the Ayy ubid polities were de jure conducted in the rulers’ names, even in the case
of the above-mentioned examples who were beyond any doubt minors. This means
that – irrespective of their age – their name was mentioned in the khut
_
bas,27 their
name appeared on the coinage,28 decrees were issued in their name, alliances were
concluded in their name,29 etc. Governance was so closely associated with the ruler
himself that it proved impossible to delegate these crucial elements of symbolic
representation to any person other than the ruler, even if he was a two-year-old
infant. The paradox that full legal capacity was ascribed to a legal minor also existed
in the European Middle Ages. Here, under-age rulers were often endowed with a
fictional majority, which allowed affairs to be conducted in their names.30 At least
in the Ayy ubid case this paradox was not solved in such an elegant manner, as
under-age rulers were beyond any doubt considered as minors. The above examples
24Ibn Was
_
il, V: 371, ‘‘qama bi-tadbir dawlati-hi’’. Although some authors term the regency in more
ambiguous terms (e.g. al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 661–670: 115 who speaks only of vizierate of Ibn
Qirnas
_
, ‘‘wa-wazara la-hu al-S
_
adr Mukhlis
_
al-Din’’), the central position of Ibn Qirnas
_
hints strongly at a
case of prolonged under-age rule. For instance, it was he who had been the driving force behind the pro-
Egyptian position of Homs, which had led to the Aleppan siege and the loss of the town in 646/1248
after which he was tortured to death.
25A rare example where a comment can be found is al-Malik al-6Aziz of Aleppo whose age of majority
(fifteen) is explicitly mentioned (see Ibn Was
_
il, IV: 227).
26Al-Y unini, M usa b. Muh
_
ammad (d. 726/1326), Dhayl mir8at al-zaman, ed. n.n., volumes I–IV
(Hyderabad: Mat
_
ba6at Majlis Da8irat al-Ma6arif al-6Uthmaniyya, 1954–1961), IV: 236: ‘‘wa-qama
bi-tadbir mulki-hi [. . .]’’.
27For example: al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur (Egypt) (Ibn al-Athir, 6Ali b. Muh
_
ammad (d. 630/1233), al-Kamil f i
l-ta8rikh, ed. C.J. Tornberg), volumes I–XIII (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1965–1967) (reprint of 1851–1871
edition with corrections and new pagination), XII: 156; al-Malik al-Ashraf (Egypt) (Ibn Was
_
il, Paris
1703: fol. 112b).
28For Ayy ubid coins issued in the name of under-age rulers cf. P. Balog, The Coinage of the Ayy ubids
(London, 1980), pp.114–5: al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur of Egypt; in Balog, 218–24: al-Malik al-6Aziz of Aleppo;
in Balog, 224–40: al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Y usuf of Aleppo.
29For example al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Y usuf of Aleppo with the R um Salj uq Sultan (Ibn Was
_
il, V: 131).
30Offergeld, 34ff.
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of the Aleppian rulers al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Y usuf, who declared himself as having
reached majority six years after he had come to power, and al-Malik al-6Aziz, who
was said to have attained majority some thirteen years after his accession to the
throne, clearly show that a considerable span of their rule was not only de facto but
also in legal terms under age. Yet even this obvious contradiction between legal
norm and historical practice did not lead to a detailed consideration of the issue in
legal and historical discourse.
Under-age rule and dynastic succession
Under-age rule is an inherent feature of the principle of dynastic succession. This is
not only seen with the kings of the Old Testament and pre-Islamic divine kings in
Near Eastern civilisations,31 but also in the Ayy ubid period considered here. It is
this link which, to a large degree, explains the uneven distribution of under-age rule
within the Ayy ubid realms. Some principalities such as Aleppo, with entrenched
father-to-son succession, repeatedly had an under-age ruler on the throne, while
others such as Damascus, with much more varied patterns of succession, never
experienced such a situation. Thus, the system of succession in the various
principalities was markedly flexible. Owing to this flexibility, under-age rule hardly
appeared in the dynasty’s most significant seats of power where a contender could
oust the young ruler with a convincing claim of legitimacy.
Sunnism tended to be theoretically averse to inherited rule, as its adherents
styled themselves as ‘‘those who loosen and tie’’ (ahl al-h
_
all wa l-6aqd), referring to
those adhering to the principle of ‘election’ in choosing leadership. However, this
feature, although regularly stressed by Sunni writers, remained a theoretical ideal
which had little impact on actual patterns of succession among Sunni dynasties
such as the Ayy ubids. The election principle mainly gained prominence in Sunni
thought as a way of distinguishing their own group from the practices of the Shiites,
who tended to make leadership of the community hereditary.32 However, in
contrast to this theoretical ideal, hereditary rule – often primogeniture – also turned
out to be the standard system of succession under the 6Abbasid caliphs and among
the various local dynasties. From the fifth/eleventh century onwards a second mode
of succession, spreading from Central Asia, gained prominence in Egypt and Syria:
here, all male members of the extended family, i.e. including uncles and cousins,
could legitimately claim succession. The recognised and legitimate ruler was the
one who proved himself the most powerful during the succession conflict(s). This
system was also a legacy of the Salj uqs who spread this concept of a family empire
after they had risen to power in most of the Islamic Asian world.
It was the combination of these two systems which characterised the Ayy ubid
system of succession: while the realms were first divided among the cousins and
brothers, most towns and regions tended to adopt subsequently hereditary rule in
the father-to-son mode, generally primogeniture. In regions such as Aleppo, Homs,
Hama, Diyar Bakr I and Diyar Bakr II succession was mostly father-to-son,
31Cf. Ko¨lzer, 295.
32The principle’s discursive prominence must be furthermore understood in light of anti-Umayyad
writings, in which blaming this dynasty for introducing hereditary rule became a recurrent topos (Crone,
36–9 and 226–7).
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sometimes brother to brother,33 never cousin-to-cousin or uncle-to-nephew.34
In general, rulers appointed in first place in the line of succession, sons born to a
wife of royal descent; in second place, were sons of other wives, and finally, other
relatives. A typical example was the will left by al-Malik al-Z
_
ahir of Aleppo who
named his two-year-old son al-Malik al-6Aziz (born to Dayfa, daughter of al-Malik
al-6Adil) as heir apparent, the older brother al-Malik al-S
_
alih
_
Ah
_
mad (born to
a concubine) ranked second35 and his nephew al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur (r. Egypt,
595–596/1198–1200), who had been previously ousted by his uncle al-Malik
al-6Adil from Egypt, in third place.36
However, the Ayy ubids are with regard to their system of succession no singular
case, but rather inherited and further developed a tradition that was characteristic
for the political landscape of the Syrian lands. In a sense, they were the final point of
a development, which had started with the appearance of the Salj uqs on the region’s
political scene in the late fifth/eleventh century. The new ‘Central Asian’ mode of
succession within the enlarged family, that had been introduced by the Salj uqs, was
gradually indigenised by the Syrian Salj uq and Zangid rulers in the following
decades by combining it with existing modes of succession. It was with the
Ayy ubids that this artful combination of different traditions was developed to its
heyday and adapted to the dynasty’s demands.
The transition to the following Maml uk Empire, in contrast, engendered a
number of changes on the level of high politics, which broke also with this line of
development. The Maml uks adhered, at least in the sultanate’s early period, to an
entirely different non-hereditary mode of succession. This mode had hardly any
place or need for under-age rulers, except being put up as a stop-gap measure so
that the future ruler could consolidate his powerbase.37 Now, the issue of under-age
role not only ceased to play the prominent role that it had played in the previous
centuries, but took also a distinctively different role in the succession process.
The prominence of hereditary succession from father-to-son during the Ayy ubid
period was also apparent in discourses on rule. When S
_
alah
_
al-Din recovered from
serious illness his friend and counsellor 6Alam al-Din Ibn Jandar (d. 587/1192)38
reproached him for neglecting the issue of succession. Although the dialogue’s main
function was to introduce the panegyric topos of the ruler’s disregard for his own
33For example: In Hama: al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Qilij Arslan to his brother al-Malik al-Muz
_
affar; In Diyar
Bakr I: al-Malik al-Awh
_
ad (r. 596–607/1200–1210) to his brother al-Malik al-Ashraf I (r. 607–617/
1210–1220; Damascus, r. 626–635/1229–1237) and the latter to his brother al-Malik al-Muz
_
affar
(r. 617–642/1220–1244).
34With the exception of al-Malik al-6Adil’s short reign in Aleppo.
35Cf. al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 651–660: 88: ‘‘He was older than his brother al-Malik al-6Aziz, but they
kept him from the sultanate of Aleppo because he was the son of a concubine and al-6Aziz the son of
Sultan al-Malik al-6Adil’s daughter.’’
36Ibn Was
_
il, III: 238 and Edde´, 85.
37Cf. the contribution to this volume by Angus Stewart ‘‘Between Baybars and Qalaw un: under-age
rulers and succession in the early Maml uk Sultanate’’, al-Masaq, 19, i (2007): 47–54. Under-
age rulers did again appear on the political scene during the Qalaw unid sultanate when hereditary
succession played a more salient role in the Maml uk succession process, cf. the contribution of
J. Van Steenbergen on the later Qalaw unids in this same volume, pp. 55–65.
38Cf. al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 581–590: 266.
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and his family’s benefit, the fact that the chroniclers chose the issue of father-to-son
succession shows its topicality:
Whenever a bird wants to build a nest for its young ones, he brings them to
the top of a tree in order to secure them. You, however, handed over the
fortresses to your family and left your sons on the ground. Aleppo is in the
hands of your brother [al-Malik al-6Adil], Hama in the hands of Taqi
al-Din [your nephew], and Homs in the hands of Shirk uh’s son [your
paternal cousin]. Your son al-6Aziz is with Taqi al-Din in Egypt, who will
depose him whenever he likes. This other son of yours is with your brother
in his tent who will do with him whatever he likes.39
It has been rightly remarked that ‘‘[i]n both tribal and Islamic Law, all sons were
equal heirs; primogeniture as practised in Europe was not permitted’’.40 However,
the Ayy ubid case shows that this absence of normative rules did not exclude the
consolidation of informal rules, which proved to be of surprisingly high relevance.
It was in those regions where the mode of father-to-son succession was firmly
entrenched, such as Aleppo, Homs and Hama, that under-age rulers played an
important role. The – potentially destabilising – rule of children did not endanger
these dynasties’ survival: all the under-age rulers in these places remained in power
until they reached the age of independent rule and continued to rule as adults.
Al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur II of Hama, coming to power at the age of ten, ruled some
forty-one years, and al-Malik al-Mujahid Asad al-Din of Homs, coming to power at
the age of twelve, ruled some fifty-six years – the longest reign in Ayy ubid history.
Nevertheless, the concept of a family empire continued to play a considerable
role in the Ayy ubid realms and primogeniture was not able to impose itself as the
exclusive principle of legitimisation. For instance, when al-Malik al-Muz
_
affar (626–
642/1229–1244), the legitimate successor to the throne of Hama, set out to fight his
younger brother, whom the town’s elite had installed against the explicit will of the
father, he sought first to legitimise his action by the idea of primogeniture. His
uncle, by contrast, advised him not to claim the throne as oldest son, but rather to
bring the elders of the town on his side, as ‘‘kingship is childless’’.41 Remnants of
the family empire concept are mainly apparent in cases where the ruler died without
leaving an heir and one of his brothers was nominated as successor.42 Alternatively,
they appear as pre-emptive measures in order to avoid potential rivalry between
family members.43 However, it was in the dynasty’s main seats of power, Egypt and
Damascus, that this form of succession, especially brother-to-brother succession,
39Ibn al-Athir, XI: 525.
40Black, 207.
41Ibn Was
_
il, IV: 89: ‘‘al-mulk 6aqim’’. In the Maml uk period this sentence came to be employed to refute
any claim to hereditary succession, cf. P. Holt, ‘‘Some observations on the 6Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo’’,
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 47 (1984): 501–507, 505 and Haarmann, 229.
42For example, the above-mentioned al-Malik al-Awh
_
ad of Diyar Bakr I passed his realms to his brother
al-Malik al-Ashraf I during his fatal illness (Ibn Was
_
il, III: 208). Al-Malik al-Ashraf I himself handed the
same lands to his brother al-Malik al-Muz
_
affar Ghazi (Ibn Was
_
il, IV: 90) and moved to Damascus,
which he handed subsequently over to another brother of his, al-Malik al-S
_
alih
_
Isma6il (Ibn Was
_
il,
V: 136).
43For example al-Malik al-S
_
alih
_
’s disposition to his entourage that once he falls ill, his brother al-Malik
al-6Adil should be immediately executed (Ibn Was
_
il, V: 376) or the fact that al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur of
Homs kept his brother al-Malik al-Mas6 ud in prison until the latter’s death (Ibn Was
_
il, V: 371).
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occurred more regularly. With the decline of the Ayy ubids, the last ruler in
Damascus even belonged to the extended family in its broadest sense: the last ruler
al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Y usuf of Aleppo (in Damascus 648–658/1250–1260) was the
previous ruler’s paternal third cousin. Tellingly, not a single under-age ruler came to
power in Damascus. The main reason for this was the town’s vivid history of
succession disputes and struggles. Its key position in the constant conflict between
Egyptian attempts to assert central authority and the vivid efforts of the Syrian
rulers to fight back44 did not allow any of the contending parties to place a ‘weak’
ruler on the throne. The unstable situation in Damascus with regard to succession
is evident in the fact that on six occasions the ruler was driven out of town by a
relative seeking the throne.45 During the seventy-six years of Ayy ubid rule, the town
experienced some eleven rulers, two of them even ruling repeatedly. By contrast,
Homs and Aleppo experienced a mere four rulers each during the eighty-eight and
seventy-nine years of Ayy ubid rule there respectively.
In Egypt, the dynasty’s focal point, the only early experience of a child king had
been instructive for the following generations. It took only one year until S
_
alah
_
al-Din’s grandson al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur, placed on the throne at the age of nine, was
chased away by his great uncle al-Malik al-6Adil. The latter legitimised his step
precisely by rejecting the concept of primogeniture and drawing on the discursive
resource of a family empire: ‘‘It is ignominious for me to act as atabak for a
youngster taking into account my seniority and precedence. In addition, kingship is
not part of the inheritance, but belongs to the victorious (al-mulk laysa huwa
bi-l-mirath wa-innama huwa li-man ghalaba). I was entitled to be the ruler after my
brother the Sultan al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir [S
_
alah
_
al-Din]’’.46 The lesson that under-age
rule over a region as significant as that of Egypt had to be avoided in the future was
learnt: the descendants of al-Malik al-6Adil avoided this and furthermore were
fortunate that a grown-up male successor was available until the very end of the
dynasty. The second Egyptian under-age ruler, al-Malik al-Ashraf, was a mere
puppet in the hands of the Maml uks, whom the chroniclers described only
ironically as ‘‘Sultan’’.47 Placed on the throne at the age of six and deposed at the
age of eight, he hardly left a trace in the sources.
Under-age rule and regents
Another fundamentally important aspect of under-age rule was the office of the
regent(s). Contemporary observers commented upon the need for them, such as
the commander of the Asadiyya corps when confronted with the infant ruler
al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur Muh
_
ammad of Egypt: ‘‘he is a child and this land is a
borderland of Islam. A regent (qayyim bi-l-mulk) who unites the troops and fights
with them is absolutely needed. The right way is that kingship is for this little child
44The Damascan succession crises were aggravated by the death of rulers who did not leave any male
offspring. For instance, after the death of al-Malik al-Ashraf I in the year 635/1237, rulers were deposed
on four occasions during conflicts between his brothers and nephews in under two years.
45Humphreys, 12.
46Ibn Was
_
il, III: 111.
47Cf. for example Ab u l-Fida8, Isma6il b. 6Ali (d. 732/1331), al-Mukhtas
_
ar f i akhbar al-bashar, ed. n.n.,
volumes I–IV (Cairo: al-Mat
_
ba6a al-H
_
usayniyya al-Mis
_
riyya, 1907), II: 184: ‘‘al-Ashraf, named
the Sultan’’ (al-Ashraf al-musamma bi-l-sult
_
an).
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and that we nominate one of S
_
alah
_
al-Din’s sons to guard him until he has grown
up’’.48 Such regency was assumed by one or several individuals from the young
ruler’s family or from the court’s elite, to whom the authors of chronicles generally
ascribe various terms, such as atabak, wali, qayyim bi-l-mulk or by employing the
verb dabbara, i.e. to manage or conduct the affairs of the polity. It is not clear from
the sources whether these regents also acted as the child’s legal guardians.
The question now arises as to what role the regent(s) played in the transition of
under-age, and more often prolonged under-age, rule towards independent rule.
As shown above, the young Ayy ubid rulers often had to wait until well beyond
attaining majority before they were able to govern without regents. In many cases
the transition was only possible once the regent(s) had died. Al-Malik al-Z
_
ahir of
Aleppo, for instance, was placed by his father S
_
alah
_
al-Din on the throne in
582/1186 at the age of fourteen. Although he shortly afterwards reached majority,49
his tutor and regent Shuja6 al-Din 6Isa b. Balash u (d. 584/1188),50 who was at the
same time commander of the citadel,51 remained in place. It was only two years
later with the death of Shuja6 al-Din that al-Malik al-Z
_
ahir began to acquire
independent rule.52 In Homs, al-Malik al-Ashraf started his period of independent
rule at the age of nineteen, the regent being killed by the Aleppian troops who
conquered the town.53 Al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur II of Hama had to wait until he was
twenty-three years old to be able to acquire independent rule, as his mother handed
rule over to him only shortly before her death.54
However, no example exists where a regent without family bonds sought to oust
the young ruler in order to take over the throne, as occurred within the Zangid
dynasty in Mosul during this period. There, the freedman Badr al-Din Lu8lu8
(r. 631–657/1234–1259) reigned over the realms of his former masters after he had
acted as regent for the town’s infant rulers.55 That Ayy ubid regents did not tend to
usurp power is also evident in cases where the young rulers acquired independent
rule not by death of the regent but by the latter’s resignation. The affairs of al-Malik
al-6Aziz of Aleppo, for example, were conducted for some fifteen years by the state’s
strongman T
_
ughril (d. 631/1233), a R um eunuch, who had been manumitted by
al-Malik al-6Aziz’s father.56 T
_
ughril handed the affairs over to al-Malik al-6Aziz
when the latter was eighteen and lived three more years in the town.57 The sources
48Ibn al-Athir, XXII: 141.
49The age of majority can be derived in this and other cases from the date of marriage, which was
generally concluded as soon as possible after maturity in order to guarantee male descendants. Where
marriage and consummation of the marriage are separated by a considerable time-span, the date of the
marriage contract alone can obviously not be taken as an indicator of the age of majority. On the case of
al-Malik al-Z
_
ahir cf. Ibn Shaddad, Y usuf b. Rafi6 (d. 632/1234), al-Nawadir al-sult
_
aniyya wa l-mah
_
asin
al-Y usufiyya, ed. J. al-Shayyal (Cairo: Dar al-Mis
_
riyya li-l-Ta8lif wa al-Tarjama, 1964), 74.
50Cf. Edde´, 39, 48, 250–1.
51Ab u Shama, Rawd
_
atayn, III: 257.
52Al-Malik al-Z
_
ahir obtained complete independent rule only with the death of his father some five years
later (after this date coins were struck in his own name), but within the town of Aleppo the death of his
tutor and regent had already offered him considerable room for manoeuvre.
53However, as he had to wait another twelve years until he was able to rule his home town again, which
was lost to Aleppo, his independency was merely apparent in his various attempts to regain an important
position within the Ayy ubid polities.
54Ab u al-Fida8, III: 196.
55For his rule, see D. Patton, Badr al-Din Lu8lu8: Atabeg of Mosul, 1211–1259 (Seattle, 1991).
56About T
_
ughril: Ibn Was
_
il, V: 72–3; al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 631–640: 53.
57For the most detailed account of this transfer of power see Ibn Was
_
il, IV: 309–10.
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do not inform us of the reasons al-Malik al-6Aziz acquired independent rule at this
precise point, which occurred some three years after the ruler had attained legal
majority at the age of fifteen.58
This relatively smooth transition to independent rule was also the outcome of the
choice of regents. No set rules existed as to who was to take over this ‘office’, which
was arguably a result of the uncertain legal status of Ayy ubid under-age rulers
regarding the de jure conduct of rule. However, a consideration of Ayy ubid regents
(cf. Table II) shows some patterns of who was entrusted with this position. The
choice of a male relative as regent – as referred to by the aforementioned
commander of the Asadiyya corps in Egypt – ranked at the lower end of preferences
since the danger for the dynastic succession was all too obvious. The commander’s
words stem from the only case where this was tested in the Ayy ubid period. The
chaotic circumstances surrounding the search for a regent for al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur of
Egypt and the outcome – a break in the dynastic succession – prevented any further
attempt to try out this option. After al-Mans
_
ur’s father al-Malik al-6Aziz 6Uthman
(r. 589–595/1193–1198) had died, the latter’s will that al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur should
become ruler with Baha8 al-Din Qaraq ush al-Asadi (d. 597/1201)59 acting as regent
was initially implemented. However, two of his paternal uncles submitted to this
state of affairs only after a long dispute, as they both demanded the regency for
themselves. After a short period opposition to Qaraq ush mounted among the elite
and a further paternal uncle, al-Malik al-Afd
_
al of Damascus, was finally contacted
to take over the regency. The elite was aware of the potential danger inherent in this
solution and set three conditions of ‘‘contractual regency’’: the regency was limited
in time to seven years (i.e. when the ruler turned sixteen), the regent was not
allowed to raise the banners of the Sultan, and his name was not to be mentioned in
the khut
_
ba or to appear on coins.60 Al-Malik al-Afd
_
al accepted and took over the
regency, but was ousted after just one year by his uncle al-Malik al-6Adil who
subsequently deposed al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur, so ending the rule of S
_
alah
_
al-Din’s
descendants in Egypt.61 This episode brought also forth one of the rare instances
where an under-age ruler was described in derisive terms. In words Ibn Was
_
il
ascribed to al-Malik al-6Adil, he was made to remark, ‘‘I think that this youngster
should go to school’’.62
As a result of these events the other regents in the Ayy ubid period were members
of the administrative and military elite or female family members. Under-age rule
was never again accompanied by the chaotic circumstances of al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur’s
rule, and no under-age ruler – except the puppet Sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf of Egypt
at the end of the Ayy ubid period – was again ousted by his regent. Ayy ubid regents
who were not related to the under-age ruler by family bonds were in general
surprisingly low-profile figures about whom little is known. We have hardly any
information, besides the odd two lines devoted to them, on the biography of regents
such as the amir Sayf al-Din Yazk uj (Aleppo, 579/1183),63 the amir Arslan B ugha
58Ibn Was
_
il, IV: 227.
59About him see al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 591–600: 312.
60See Ibn Was
_
il, III: 88–90, for the question of succession.
61See Ibn Was
_
il, III: 109–114 for al-Malik al-6Adil taking power.
62Ibn Was
_
il, III: 111.
63Died 599/1203. Cf. Ab u Shama, al-Dhayl 6ala l-Rawd
_
atayn (published as: Tarajim rijal al-qarnayn
al-sadis wa l-sabi6), ed. Muh
_
ammad al-Kawthari (Cairo: Maktabat Nashr al-Thaqafa al-Islamiyya, 1947)
[reprint Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1974]: 34; al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 591–600: 421 and Edde´, 35.
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(Homs, 581–?/1186–?),64 the h
_
ajib or chamberlain Shuja6 al-Din 6Isa b. Balash u65
(Aleppo, 582–584/1186–1188) and the vizier Mukhlis
_
al-Din Ibrahim Ibn Qirnas
_
(Homs, 644–648/1246–1248).66 It is only with Shihab al-Din T
_
ughril (Aleppo,
613–628/1216–1231), the above-mentioned regent of al-Malik al-6Aziz, that we
possess a more complete picture of an Ayy ubid regent.67 T
_
ughril had been a trusted
maml uk and one of the leading amirs of al-Malik al-6Aziz’s father, al-Malik al-Z
_
ahir.
Of R um descent and being a eunuch, he was certainly an ideal regent with no family
ties to lead him to impose his own dynasty. T
_
ughril was praised unanimously in the
texts for his extreme loyalty to his Ayy ubid patrons, which culminated in his
voluntary retreat from the position when he considered the young ruler able to rule
independently.
The second main option for nominating a regent was to choose one of the female
relatives who played, in general, a considerable role in Ayy ubid politics. This
happened in two cases where the regency was held by the ruler’s mother
or grandmother: Dayfat Khat un,68 the grandmother of al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir Y usuf of
Aleppo in the years 634–640/1236–1242; and Ghaziyat Khat un,69 the mother of
al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur II in Hama in the years 642–c.655/1244–c.1257. In both cases
these regents obviously protected the interests of the under-age ruler, but the case
of Ghaziyat Khat un shows that this was no guarantee for the young ruler to obtain
independent rule after reaching majority. It was only shortly before her death,
when her son was already in his twenties, that she finally handed power over to him.
The texts report unanimously that both female regents were supported by a council
of four (male) members.70 While these councils handled the administration, the
final decision of any proposal had to be submitted to the female regent.
As we have seen, under-age rule was a frequently occurring phenomenon during
the Ayy ubid period and such rulers had, despite their minority, full legal capacity to
rule their realms. Under-age rulers were not put forward merely in order to
legitimise the rule of their respective regent(s) or as place-holders in order
to guarantee the succession of a strong candidate who would have the opportunity
to assemble support, as was repeatedly the case in the following Maml uk period.
Rather, such rule was taken seriously as prelude to the young rulers’ subsequent
period of independent governance. Although under-age rule represented a
64Ab u Shama, Rawd
_
atayn, III: 252–3.
65Died 584/1188. Cf. Ab u Shama, Rawd
_
atayn, III: 257; Edde´, 39.
66Died 648/1248. Cf. al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 661–670: 115–117 (biography of al-Malik al-Ashraf);
Ibn Was
_
il, V: 371; Edde´, 144; Humphreys, 294.
67Died 631/1233. Cf. Ibn Was
_
il, III: 220, 237, 250–1; IV: 129, 254, 309–10; V: 9–11, 72–3 (biography),
114–117; al-Maqrizi, Ia: 185; al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 631–640: 53; Edde´, passim, esp. 103;
Humphreys, 155, 160, 166, 168, 172, 179, 182, 183.
68Died 640/1242. Cf. al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 631–640: 412; Ibn Was
_
il, V: 312–3. On her regency cf.
Edde´, 107ff.
69Died 655/1257. Cf. al-Dhahabi, Ta8rikh, vol. 651–660: 208–9 with further references; Ibn Was
_
il, Paris
1703: fol. 125b.
70In the case of Dayfa Khat un: the amir Shams al-Din Lu8lu8 al-Amini, an Armenian freedman, the amir
6Izz al-Din 6Umar b. Mujalli l-Hakkari of Kurdish descent, the vizier Jamal al-Din Ibn al-Qift
_
i and the
administrator and freedman Jamal al-Dawla Iqbal al-Khat uni, an Abysinian eunuch. In the case of
Ghaziyat Khat un: the amir Sayf al-Din T
_
ughril, the ustadhdar (mayor of the palace or majordomo) of
her husband, the vizier Baha8 al-Din b. Taj al-Din, the scholar and administrator Sharaf al-Din 6Abd
al-6Aziz b. Muh
_
ammad al-Ans
_
ari and the eunuch and administrator Shuja6 al-Din Murshid al-Mans
_
uri.
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potentially fragile period, its transition to real power was generally conducted
without substantial friction.
This rather stable situation was also a consequence of two characteristics of
Ayy ubid concepts of succession and rule. First, the possibility of under-age rule
could always be prevented – as described above – by activating the concept of a
family empire so that brothers, cousins or uncles could take over. This played an
important role in the most important places where under-age rule would have
engendered serious conflicts, such as Damascus and Egypt. The possibility of
switching between different concepts of succession allowed a flexible adaptation to
changing demands: under-age rule occurred where it had no destabilising effects
and was excluded where it posed a potential threat to the dynasty’s survival.
The second characteristic touches upon the question of how to deal with the
potential threats by neighbouring powers, whose interests in expansion were
aroused by the accession of under-age rulers – the first set of challenges raised in the
article’s introduction. It is apparent throughout the dynasty’s history that rival and
competing family branches were, despite the intricate history of inner-Ayy ubid
disputes, able to regain considerable solidarity in the face of outside threats.
For example, when al-Malik al-6Aziz of Aleppo took power in 613/1216 at the age
of two, the town turned to the Egyptian Sultan al-Malik al-6Adil for protection
against the imminent R um-Salj uq danger. Al-Malik al-6Adil sent his son al-Malik
al-Ashraf I, who installed a form of protectorate for several years over the Aleppian
realms.71 However, despite his strong position within the town he did not try to
oust the young ruler. In the same vein, when the young ruler al-Malik al-Nas
_
ir
Y usuf was endangered72 during the early years of his rule by the advancing
Khwarazmian troops, al-Malik al-Mans
_
ur of Homs offered decisive support73 –
again without trying to oust his under-age relative.
In this regard, the Ayy ubids might be again seen as the culminating point of
previous developments in the region as it was already argued above with regard to
the combination of different modes of succession. The Ayy ubids continued the
long-standing tradition that governed the relations between the region’s petty
dynasties when outside powers tried to move into the region. This mechanism has
been best shown for the early sixth/twelfth century. The various Crusading and
Muslim polities of the period were able to put their conflicts aside in order to form
alliances against Egyptian (from the southwest), Byzantine (from the north) or
Great-Salj uq (from the west) attempts to gain a foothold. The common rationale
for these alliances was expressed in the period’s texts with the term la maqam,
reflecting the fear that a great power’s intrusion would leave ‘no place’ for any of
the petty polities.74 The Ayy ubid solidarity vis-a`-vis outside threats to weakened
polities within the confederation was a continuation of these political relationships.
71Ibn Was
_
il, III: 263–270.
72Ibid., III: 263: ‘‘t
_
ifl’’, i.e. a child who had not yet reached the age of tamyiz.
73Cf. Edde´, 124–5.
74Cf. M. A. Ko¨hler, Allianzen und Vertra¨ge zwischen fra¨nkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderen
Orient: eine Studie u¨ber das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben vom 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin/
New York, 1991) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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Furthermore, the family bonds, which were continuously reinforced by an active
marriage policy throughout the existence of the dynasty intensified this mechanism
in the Ayy ubid case so that formal and informal alliances could be easily concluded
between hitherto rival polities.
The flexible concept of succession combined with this solidarity within the
Ayy ubid family confederation vis-a`-vis external powers, not only made way for a
number of under-age rulers, but also for the successful conduct of their rule.
Although under-age rule was a potentially destabilising factor in personalised
polities, the Ayy ubid example shows to what degree flexible and efficient solutions
were at hand in order to minimise the internal and external risks inherent in these
periods of weakened rule.
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